What Is the Role of the Government in Wildlife Policy? Evolutionary Governance Perspective by Niedziałkowski, Krzysztof & Putkowska-Smoter, Renata
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 428–438
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i2.4106
Article
What Is the Role of the Government in Wildlife Policy? Evolutionary
Governance Perspective
Krzysztof Niedziałkowski 1,2,* and Renata Putkowska‐Smoter 1,3
1 Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland; E‐Mail: kniedzialkowski@ifispan.edu.pl (K.N.)
2 Mammal Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
3 Faculty of Sociology and Education, Warsaw University of Life Sciences, Poland;
E‐Mail: renata_putkowska‐smoter@sggw.edu.pl (R.P.‐S.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 30 January 2021 | Accepted: 13 April 2021 | Published: in press
Abstract
With the growing populations and range of large wild mammals in Europe, wildlife governance has grown in importance
and provoked social conflicts, pressuring policy‐makers to provide adequate policy responses. Some countries chose decen‐
tralised approaches, while others retain traditional top‐down mechanisms. However, evolutionary mechanisms behind
those changes and their impact on steering have attracted relatively little attention. We investigated the evolution of the
governance of three wildlife species (European bison, moose, and wolf) in Poland (1945–2020) to map their existing paths
and explore external and internal factors influencing steering patterns. The results suggest that despite the persistent dom‐
inance of state‐centred governance and top‐down hierarchical instruments characteristic for a post‐socialist country, steer‐
ing involved intense and often informal communication with influential actors. A growing diversity of actors and discourses
in wildlife governance increased the state’s steering options and improved conservation outcomes. Concurrently, the gov‐
ernment’s steering shifted from concrete policy results to managing tensions and interests within the field. These transfor‐
mations helped to retain the effectiveness of steering in the changing context,while retaining state‐dominated governance.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, the populations of large mammals
in Europe have increased in range and numbers, lead‐
ing, in some areas, to a perception of overabundance
(Carpio et al., 2020; Chapron et al., 2014). These pro‐
cesseswere associatedwith a number of socio‐economic
factors, such as new pan‐European regulations, struc‐
tural changes in rural areas opening new habitats for
wildlife, improved hunting management and a support‐
ive public opinion (Boitani & Linnell, 2015; Navarro &
Pereira, 2015). Increasing wildlife populations exacer‐
bated human–wildlife conflicts, and translated into calls
for more participatory governance (Redpath et al., 2017).
The responses of the European states differed depend‐
ing on their policy‐making styles, legislation, political his‐
tory and traditions of wildlife management (de Boon
et al., 2020; Putman, 2011; Stöhr & Coimbra, 2013).
The level of state intervention permitted in legislation
and acceptable to the people can range fromalmost com‐
plete state control to practically no involvement (Putman,
2011). Although most countries adopt state‐dominated
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governance, some took steps to decentralise decision‐
making (Bjärstig et al., 2014; Sandström et al., 2018).
In federal countries, wildlife governance is dominated
by regional authorities (de Boon et al., 2020; Stöhr &
Coimbra, 2013).
Literature on wildlife governance tends to focus
either on existing governance arrangements or on
the transformation from one mode of governance to
another, while evolution within the modes is much less
frequently explored. This involves the question of how
the dominant state government responds to the chang‐
ing context of policy‐making while retaining its steer‐
ing role and the effectiveness of interventions. This arti‐
cle aims at addressing this gap by exploring changes in
the governance of three species (the European bison,
the moose, and the wolf) in Poland. In contrast to
Nordic and Western‐European countries, the wildlife
policies of post‐socialist states have only been analysed
to a limited extent, although these countries, depend‐
ing predominantly on representative mechanisms and
top‐down, hierarchical steering (Börzel & Buzogány,
2010; Niedziałkowski et al., 2016), have been success‐
ful in preserving some key charismatic wildlife during
the turbulent 20th century. We used the Evolutionary
Governance Theory (EGT; Beunen et al., 2015) as an
organising perspective to explore the determinants of
the stability of wildlife institutions and the role of the
state in their dynamics, as well as to investigate chal‐
lenges and opportunities connected with state steering
in the context of socio‐political transformations.
2. Wildlife, Steering and the Evolutionary Perspective
Literature advocating for more bottom‐up governance
of wildlife constitutes a strain of broader research
that points to the growing complexity of environmen‐
tal problems and highlights the inadequacies of cen‐
tralised, hierarchical, expert‐based models of decision‐
making (Armitage et al., 2012). Instead, it emphasises the
need for decentralised, polycentric, cross‐scale modes
of inclusive governing involving state, market and soci‐
ety actors (Gunningham, 2009; Newig & Fritsch, 2009).
Particular attention is devoted to stakeholder partic‐
ipation that should facilitate the diversity of values
and knowledge (Reed, 2009; Renn, 2006). The initial
vision of governance as the ‘hollowing out’ of the state
(Rhodes, 2007) was increasingly replaced with recogni‐
tion that the state’s role remains central as governments
blend hierarchy with new collaborative approaches and
engage in ‘metagovernance’: ‘steering at a distance,’
mobilising resources of various groups, and overseeing
the process, while maintaining participants’ autonomy
(Kooiman, 2003; Meuleman, 2008).
‘Steering’ can be understood as “governing by set‐
ting the course, monitoring the direction and correcting
deviations from the course set” (Crawford, 2006, p. 453).
It requires: (1) being explicit about the direction and
communicating it to those rowing; (2) establishing mech‐
anisms for verifying performance; (3) using knowledge
and resources of other actors; and (4) installing regula‐
tory mechanisms to stimulate and respond to the perfor‐
mance of rowing actors (Crawford, 2006). In governance
literature, steering is seen broadly as the inclusion of vari‐
ous actors into governing through networks and soft law,
in order to improve the process of policy formulation
and implementation, but also in response to the growing
bottom‐up pressure of non‐state actors (Capano et al.,
2015; Meadowcroft, 2007). As the numbers of actors
with various, often incommensurable goals increases,
steering becomes more complex, especially concerning
the need to coordinate policies across public sectors.
The state’s steering interventions can cover a spectrum
from no steering at all, through various forms of par‐
ticipatory, decentralised and devolved networks, where
governments ‘steer at a distance,’ to increasingly direct
state interventions in representative systems,where poli‐
cies (‘steering’) are implemented through the ‘rowing’
of public hierarchies and command‐and‐control instru‐
ments (laws, policies, administrative control) with little
participation. Still, even in the latter, some forms of
bottom‐up influence and consultations with non‐state
actors may occur, and governments’ steering may be
bound by forces within and outside of particular policy
sectors (Olsen, 2009).
In wildlife governance, the calls for more bottom‐up
approaches tomitigate human–wildlife conflicts resulted
in many approaches stimulating stakeholder engage‐
ment: education and information, collaborative planning,
community‐based management, etc. (Nyhus, 2016).
The record of such initiatives regarding environmental
goals and social cohesion is mixed (Hansson‐Forman
et al., 2018; Kellert et al., 2000). Despite their focus on
a wide range of stakeholders, participatory approaches
require regulations, public policies and the involvement
of the state for their effectiveness (Meadowcroft, 1998),
and need to be crafted individually without blueprint
solutions (Ostrom et al., 2007). Concurrently, the field
for such designs is limited by the history or interactions
between stakeholders, power structures, discourses and
the dominant governance mechanisms (Sullivan, 2019;
Voss et al., 2007). Another thing is, the state can be
viewed not only as a powerful actor in wildlife gover‐
nance but also as arenas of collective action, where key
stakeholders vie for control of public policy (Avelino &
Wittmayer, 2016; Paavola, 2007).
The EGT (Beunen et al., 2015; Van Assche et al., 2013)
conceptualises governance as the process of taking col‐
lectively binding decisions, that are continuously evolv‐
ing in various locations and communities across scales
through constant interactions between heterogeneous
actors (public and private), representing different dis‐
courses, confirming or contesting formal and informal
institutions (rules and tools of the game), and adapting
to or altering the transforming materialities. At the same
time, the evolution of governance is structured by depen‐
dencies: path dependencies (cognitive, organisational,
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material), current interdependencies between actors
and institutions, and goal dependencies, associated with
the impact of visions of the future on the reproduc‐
tion of governance in the present. In the EGT, steering
options are conditioned (both restricted and enabled)
by co‐evolutions in dialectical relationships between
actors/institutions and knowledge/power. According to
Beunen et al. (2015), steering always involves the partici‐
pation of various actors, as successful steering requires
the balancing of interests, although it is not always
formally acknowledged. Understanding current steering
options requires mapping of the governance path by
exploring historical interactions between actors, institu‐
tions, power and knowledge, as well as the mapping of
the wider socio‐economic and environmental context of
these interactions.
In the following, informed by EGT, we will trace the
long‐term development of Polish wildlife governance
and the role of government steering based on the case
studies concerning the governance of the European
bison, the wolf and the moose. Our research ques‐
tions are as follows: (1) How and in which context
were the configurations of actors/institutions and knowl‐
edge/power evolving over the last century in Polish
wildlife governance? (2) What was the impact of major
historical shifts on the evolution of the policy domain?
(3) How were the steering options of the state influ‐
encedby the evolution of governance and existing paths?
(4) What were the steering goals of the state?
3. Methods
The research material came from two projects realised
between 2015 and 2020, the results of which were pub‐
lished in three papers, where more detailed informa‐
tion and sources can be found (Niedziałkowski, 2019;
Niedziałkowski & Putkowska‐Smoter, 2020; Putkowska‐
Smoter &Niedziałkowski, 2020). The cases address three
species representing different approaches to wildlife:
(1) the European bison died out in the wild in 1919, and
since then have been treated as a vulnerable species
in need of protection; (2) the wolves were for the
most part of the 20th century perceived as a harmful
species (pest) requiring strong lethal control; (3) the
moose were treated as a game species. We mapped the
governance paths concerning these species and iden‐
tified key events, groups of actors involved and recur‐
ring story‐lines through the analysis of various texts pub‐
lished between 1920 and 2019 concerning their manage‐
ment. These included legal regulations and their official
justifications, parliamentary proceedings, official policy
documents and reports, publications in leading journals
specializing in forest management, hunting, and nature
conservation (e.g., Aura, Chrońmy Przyrodę Ojczystą,
Łowiec Polski, Dzikie Życie, Las Polski, Przyroda Polska),
and articles from popular press (e.g., Gazeta Wyborcza,
Tygodnik Powszechny, Newsweek).
Additionally, in 2015–2019 we carried out 50 semi‐
structured interviews with key stakeholders (Table 1),
which helped us to identify informal rules in the analy‐
sed sub‐domains and to clarify some parts of the discur‐
sive background not evident in the written material (e.g.,
the meanings of categories such as ‘nature’ and ‘protec‐
tion,’ personal identities and interpretations of events).
The intervieweeswere selected basedonwritten sources
and snowball‐sampling. The interviews took between
25–130minutes, andwere assisted by an interview guide
(see Supplementary File) with open‐ended questions
regarding: key events, key groups of actors involved, their
discursive positions and impact on policy‐making, and
key challenges for wildlife governance. The interviews
were transcribed and anonymised.We analysed the data
collected through desk research and interviews with
Atlas.ti software through theory‐driven coding (Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005), in order to reconstruct the evolution of
wildlife governance focusing on key events, actors, dis‐
courses, and institutions. This allowed us to identify and
interpret patterns and differences in our case studies in
a comparative manner.
4. Results
4.1. The European Bison
The European bison became extinct in the wild in the
aftermath of World War I. Since 1923, various groups of
actors collaborated both on a national and international
level to reintroduce the species. In Poland, this collabora‐
tion involved state and non‐state actors: zoologists, vet‐
erinarians, breeding specialists, foresters, hunters, and
Table 1. Number of interviewees by group of actors and by case.
The European Bison The Moose The Wolf
Scientists 8 7 7
Foresters 5 2** —
Hunters — 1 2***
Public Officials* 9 2 1
Activists 2 2 2
Journalists — 1 —
TOTAL 23 15 12
Notes: * including national park staff; ** both foresters were also hunters; *** both hunters were also foresters.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 428–438 430
public officials. The state’s involvement, perceived as cru‐
cial, was encouraged by framing bison restitution as a
patriotic obligation. The bison were portrayed as requir‐
ing the constant support of experts in animal husbandry
and breeding. Knowledge of actors involved and their
learning‐by‐doing translated into successful and largely
informal practices (e.g., feeding, transportation, veteri‐
nary work) and organisational arrangements contribut‐
ing to bison restitution. Those institutions created a
material and organisational legacy (e.g., breeding cen‐
tres and organisations operating them) thus strengthen‐
ing the path dependency. Formal rules were introduced
only in 1938, when the bison became legally protected.
Considering the steering options of the state, in this for‐
mative period, they were largely restricted to informal
networking and the mobilisation of state resources to
facilitate the bottom‐up initiatives of the key groups,
and restricted to the goals suggested by those groups.
The members of these groups encouraged the state’s
steering, perceiving it as a guarantee for bison conserva‐
tion in the long term.
After World War II, the role of the state’s steering in
bison governance strengthened, together with a general
trend toward state dominance in public life, which is char‐
acteristic for the communist societies. The adopted goals
were implemented by means of hierarchical, top‐down
governance and public organisations (national parks and
state forest service). Still, some specific objectives (e.g.,
an optimal number of bison in the key site of the
Białowieża Forest)were established informally by awider
range of actors, including various government depart‐
ments with different preferences. As recalled by an inter‐
viewed bison manager:
There was a memo signed by Prof. Karpiński [direc‐
tor of the Białowieża National Park],Mr. Jaroński [gov‐
ernment official], and Dr. Żabiński [expert in zoology]
stating that the main goal of bison breeding in closed
reserves would be releasing them into the wild, set‐
ting them free. And, obviously, it could not have been
done so straightforwardly. It had to be intensively
consulted with the State Forests Holding, because it
was their territory. At some point one of the direc‐
tors or ministers approved it, and after four years we
could release two bulls [from the reserve] to see how
they would behave.
In the mid‐1970s, the government representatives and
scientists from the ministerial advisory body decided to
start controlling the population lethally. This was stimu‐
lated by pressure from the forestry administration aswell
as limited infrastructure. Stakeholders, operating largely
within public organisations, negotiated the implemen‐
tation details of this goal through informal conflicting,
and the state became an arbiter of these internal strug‐
gles. Some steering institutions formalised in the form
of administrative government consent for bison culling
by forest and national park administrations. Despite the
formal strict protection and the dominant discourse of
bison as a vulnerable symbol of nature conservation, the
species became lethally controlled and its population
stopped growing.
After the democratic transition in 1989, the govern‐
ment became more environmentally conscious, mostly
owing to new environmental NGOs and the expected
EU accession. It developed an informal practice of
allowing for less bison culling in the Białowieża Forest
than requested by the managers. The population again
started increasing and dispersing, but there was no clear
goal of bison policy. Such new visions were presented
shortly before Poland’s EU accession by specialists in
wildlife ecology, who criticised traditional arrangements,
informed by zootechnical knowledge. They proposed
expanding a few controlled populations and rewilding
them to become more resilient to new risks associated
with human interventions and climate change. They also
lobbied the government and collaborated with other
actors (foresters, local communities, NGOs) to install
a new goal and create interdependencies (e.g., farm‐
ers receiving money for feeding bison). Bison manage‐
ment was supposed to be more adaptive, and based
on scientific evidence provided by wildlife ecologists.
The state welcomed these initiatives as an opportu‐
nity to improve bison governance and mobilise external
resources for bison conservation. The new set of goals
also increased the policy options that the government
could pursue. Its consent, required for the application for
EU resources, became an additional steering tool within
the state’s toolkit.
However, dominant actors defended the traditional
paradigm and practices. One of the central figures, a
professor of animal genetics and breeding, partially
employed at the Ministry of Environment, established a
bison conservation NGO and co‐authored a bison conser‐
vation strategy, accepted by the ministry in 2007. It fol‐
lowed the traditional conservation discourse focused on
the mitigation of conflicts with agriculture and forestry,
and continuing proven practices but on a larger scale.
The bison conservation NGO, with the government’s
consent, initiated new conservation projects with EU
funding, which strengthened the community of bison
managers and the resilience of existing approaches.
The government, retaining control measures, allowed
public and non‐public actors to operate within the sub‐
domain and negotiate both the goals and the means
to implement them within the existing legal framework
(both national and European), as well as to seek exter‐
nal resources for these purposes. The new EU context
proved favourable to this mode of steering. The final
shape of the actor/institutions and power/knowledge
parameters of the sub‐domain of bison policy depended
on the effectiveness of different groups in mobilising
resources and creating coalitions that the state acknowl‐
edged. Additionally, the state’s support was also condi‐
tioned by the political situation—the liberal government
supported the new discoursewhile the conservative one,
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in power since 2015, backed the traditional approach,
strengthening the path.
4.2. The Moose
After World War I, the moose in Poland was close to
extinction. The restoration of the species, legally con‐
sidered to be game, was delegated by state authorities
under hunting legislation to hunters and foresters who
dominated the field of hunting. The former, associated
within the Polish Hunting Association, were perceived as
experts in wildlife management. The latter, employed by
the public State Forests Holding, managed moose habi‐
tats. Their efforts increased moose population from a
few individuals in the 1920s to 1372 in 1938. This suc‐
cess in the formative period of the moose policy in the
newly established Polish state proved important for the
further evolution of the sub‐domain as it legitimised the
key groups involved. After World War II, the restoration
started from scratch, this time in the communist context.
Again, foresters and hunters led the process as experts,
and the steering of the state was restricted to the for‐
mal control of the activities of the dominant groups and
goals that they prioritised. These groups, however, in the
new socio‐political context, became closely aligned with
the state as part of the hierarchical public bureaucra‐
cies. The cooperation of foresters and hunters was facili‐
tated by the shared discourse perceiving themoose as an
object to be hunted in the future and the pre‐war resti‐
tution as an inspiration and obligation. The moose was
legally considered to be game, as the hunting regimewas
considered more effective in preventing illegal poach‐
ing than the conservation one. Restoration included
guarding moose reserves and informing local commu‐
nities about penalties for poaching. The moose popula‐
tion quickly increased to around 700 in 1967, and the
hunting press started advocating selective shooting. In
1967, the dominant actors convinced the government
that the moose was successfully restored and could now
be hunted.
The moose numbers continued growing (to approx.
5100 in 1979) despite increasing hunting bag. Moose
hunting, perceived as a unique experience, was prof‐
itable for local hunting clubs who could sell meat for
exports. It also limited damages in forest plantations.
Consequently, in the 1970s, the hunting pressure grew.
In the early 1980s, the quotas reached around 1500
moose annually and remained at 1200–1300 moose
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, although some
wildlife and game biologists argued that it was unsus‐
tainable. In the late 1980s, scientists started criticis‐
ing the lack of proper rules around moose hunting,
pointed to alleged overestimating of official moose num‐
bers, and proposed changes in the management of
this issue. Socio‐political changes in Poland after 1989
further increased harvesting, as hunters, uncertain of
the prospective reform of game management, secured
immediate gains. The state did not intervene in the hunt‐
ing policy as the dominant groups of actors in the field
did not see the problem as requiring intervention.
At the same time, socio‐political changes in Poland
after 1989 made the government more open to the
arguments of actors traditionally sidelined within the
sub‐domain (NGOs and conservation biologists) and to
the use of new steering instruments from the field
of nature conservation, rather than the hunting policy.
The establishment of the Biebrza National Park (BNP) in
1993 could be seen as a key example of such a steer‐
ing intervention inmoose governance. The BNP included
areas with the highest density of moose in Poland and
significantly limited access to game. For the first time,
a large moose population was protected, not for hunt‐
ing but for conservation. Park managers implemented
new rules without the involvement of foresters and
hunters, which proved difficult to accept by those groups.
However, the BNP was not enough to stop the popula‐
tion decline. In 2000, there were only approx. 1900 ani‐
mals left, which challenged the effectiveness of hunt‐
ing in sustaining moose populations. Responding to the
crisis, hunters urged the government to introduce the
proven tool of a moratorium on moose hunting, retain‐
ing its game status. It was to last 3–10 years until the
moose population recovered. In 2001, the government
introduced the moratorium but without specifying its
duration, which could be interpreted as strengthening
the state’s steering beyond the traditional responses
advocated by the dominant actors. After a few years,
foresters started indicating growing damage in forests
and increasing road accidents with moose. Perceiving
the prolonged moratorium as a government failure to
take responsibility for moose management, they also
increasingly pressed authorities for some lethal control.
In the meantime, environmental activists, whose influ‐
ence grew after 1989, challenged the domination of
the foresters and hunters—they called for open debates,
wider public participation and the involvement of exter‐
nal experts and media. They portrayed the moose as
a national treasure which should be accepted in Polish
forests, despite the damages involved, and interpreted
the 2001 moratorium as a failure of the traditional
approach. The activists were supported by conservation
biologists, who challenged the dominant actors’ knowl‐
edge concerning moose management. This diversity of
discourses and groups that represented them put the
government in the position of an arbiter, which could
pick policy options and steer the policy depending on the
perceived state of the population and the socio‐political
context of the sub‐domain.
Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 and the pres‐
sure formore participatory environmental policy‐making
strengthened the moratorium. In 2009, the government,
looking for new policy options, commissioned an expert
group, led by a wildlife biologist and including foresters
and hunters, to prepare a strategy of moose manage‐
ment. The final document recommended limited hunt‐
ing in four provinces, preceded by 3–5 years of partial
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 428–438 432
protection under the nature conservation law. Also, it
proposed a new government advisory group, including
various stakeholders, to guide moose management. The
strategywas not practically implemented, because it was
vetoed by foresters and hunters, who associated the pro‐
tected status with a passive approach towards nature,
and did not trust that it would lead to the restoration of
hunting. Still, the strategy became a reference point for
the environmental actors, who considered the morato‐
rium as a sub‐optimal solution, but preferred it over the
traditional hunting approach. The environmental actors
were successful in publicising attempts to restore hunt‐
ing by the government in 2014 and 2017, and mobilising
public opinion against such initiatives. As recalled by an
interviewed forester:
We started writing proposals [to the Ministry] to
restore the moose hunting season and the Ministry
always responded evasively. So we pointed out that
a number of moose counts had been carried out and
such‐and‐such a scientific expert authorised them.
They responded that restoring the hunting season
was out of the question but some moose could be
shot for scientific purposes….And this scientific har‐
vesting was cancelled after public outcry….Suddenly
there was a phone call from the Ministry of the
Environment: ‘Stop moose shooting, because some‐
one wrote something in the press.’
These attempts revealed the limits to the steering capac‐
ity of the state and the impact of foresters and hunters.
It also showed that in order to set the direction and
implement it practically, the state needed to engage to
a larger extent in negotiation with different groups in
the domain. So far, it has failed to do so and the moose
policy can be characterised as drifting without clear pol‐
icy goals.
4.3. The Wolf
In the formative period of wolf policy in Poland after
1918, the species was considered to be game that that
could be hunted throughout the year, and its governance
was dominated by hunters. DuringWorldWar II, the wolf
population increased and hunters perceived this as a
major problem affecting game resources and farm ani‐
mals. They advocated a strong reduction of the species
and pressed the government to organise an extermi‐
nation action to limit losses for the national economy.
In their view, the recognition of the problem by the
state and its organisational and financial involvement
was indispensable:
In order to plan and prepare this action [against the
wolf] properly, it is necessary to recognise the impor‐
tance of this issue at the governmental level, dis‐
cuss, agree and issue a number of ordinances by
the state authorities, ensure that these ordinances
are properly understood by the executive branches
and, finally, to prepare the Polish Hunting Association
to complete tasks that it will be entrusted with.
(Żebrowski, 1952, p. 8)
The government responded in 1955 using top‐down,
command‐and‐control steering instruments oriented at
reaching the goals advocated by hunters. It proclaimed
a comprehensive extirpation programme to be imple‐
mented by dedicated hierarchically organised public offi‐
cials, and supported by high bounties. Its progress was
assessed in hunting press, putting pressure on public
authorities to strengthen their efforts. The programme
proved successful, and by the mid‐1970s, only around
60 wolves survived (less than 10% of the post‐war pop‐
ulation) in a few pockets in eastern Poland.
Since the 1960s, some game and wildlife biologists
started suggesting that the wolf should not be extermi‐
nated because of its useful role in ecosystems. Their posi‐
tion was supported by international developments—in
1973, the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) published guidelines on wolf conservation urging
for the restoration of wolf populations based on scien‐
tific evidence. In 1975, the government listed the wolf
as a game species and curtailed the eradication efforts.
The population started growing, and by 1990 it reached
almost 900 individuals. The wolf was perceived as a com‐
petitor over the game and a prestigious prey, which
needs to be kept at a ‘reasonable’ level through hunting.
Wolf management was administered within hunting dis‐
tricts, either by the Polish Hunting Association or by the
State ForestsHolding,while supervisedby theMinistry of
Forestry. Specialists in game management provided sci‐
entific advice.
The socio‐political transformation of Poland in 1989
stimulated the growth of environmental NGOs and, sup‐
ported by the prospect of the EU integration, put envi‐
ronmental issues high on the political agenda. Because
of personal connections with the new people in power
and the greater accessibility of democratically elected
politicians, environmental actors could intensively lobby
forwolf protection.Wildlife biologists provided newdata
on wolf biology, challenging assumptions informing the
dominant wolf governance—they highlighted the posi‐
tive role ofwolves in ecosystems and advocated their nat‐
ural recovery. This provided the government with new
steering options in terms of the goals of wolf governance
and instruments that could be used—e.g., already in
1989, the hunting of wolves in the Białowieża Forest, a
key biodiversity hotspot, was stopped. As explained by
an interviewed wildlife biologist:
After 1989 our academic tutor became a deputy
minister of the environment in the new [democrat‐
ically elected] government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
We informed him that wolf numbers were over‐
estimated and that, in fact, in such areas as the
Białowieża Forest wolf hunting should be banned
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altogether….Being a biologist and an ecologist, he
understood this very well and implemented [the
hunting ban].
In 1991, a new Nature Conservation Act gave regional
government representatives a legal avenue to protect
wildlife. Wildlife biologists and NGOs started press‐
ing them to list the wolf as a protected species.
Consequently, several of the 49 provinces introduced
wolf protection or strongly limited hunting. Activists
were also lobbying the government to protect wolves
across the country. Formally, the government could
do this by means of executive regulation, but this
would involve shifting wolf governance from the domain
of hunting to the domain of nature conservation.
Considering the position of hunters, the state was not
ready to do this. In the view of environmental activists,
government officials did not perceive the need to pro‐
tect wolves, which the activists associated with their
hunting background. To facilitate legal changes, some
activists were even providing public officials with writ‐
ten justifications for new provisions. In 1995, faced with
an increasing number of provinces transferring wolf gov‐
ernance to the nature conservation domain and recog‐
nising demands of the environmental actors, the gov‐
ernment issued a regulation designating the wolf as a
protected species in all but three provinces with high
wolf densities. Two of these provinces soon introduced
regional protection, and wolves could be hunted reg‐
ularly only in the Krosno province. Despite the pres‐
sure of the activists, the Krosno governor retained hunt‐
ing because of the opposition from hunters, foresters,
herders, and some game specialists. Concurrently, the
Polish Hunting Association tried to convince the govern‐
ment to restore wolf hunting in several provinces. While
the government had various steering options at its dis‐
posal (either in the direction of protection or hunting), it
did not implement them, due to opposing demands from
the groups involved in the governance of the species.
The general election in 1997 proved critical for
resolving the impasse. NGO activists convinced the new
minister of the environment to protect wolves across
the country. The official justification highlighted the
wolf’s role in balancing ecosystems and regulating ungu‐
lates. The government also introduced a compensation
scheme for the farmers affected by wolf depredation.
The new laws influenced the roster of groups involved
in wolf management, transferring responsibilities from
the hunting authorities to regional conservation offices
and to the conservation department in the government.
Some of the most vocal wildlife biologists prepared a
wolf management strategy, commissioned by the min‐
istry in 1998. In the following years, wolf populations
grew rapidly, reaching around 2000 individuals in 2020
and inhabiting practically all major forest areas in Poland.
Despite government changes and occasional pressure
from hunters, foresters, herders, and supported by some
game and wildlife biologists, the policy path initiated
in 1998 has been followed. Its stability was facilitated
by Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 and the con‐
servation legislation it involved. After an administrative
reform in 2007, which was supposed to improve the
implementation of the Habitat and Birds Directives, the
management of the wolf was transferred to a new state
organisation—the General Directorate of Environmental
Protection and its 16 regional branches. Compared with
its predecessors, the new organisation had more respon‐
sibilities, more resources, and was more centralised.
It also closely collaborated with various actors to fulfil
its legal remit. Consequently, the steering capacity of the
state in wolf governance strengthened, while its goals
became limited to nature conservation priorities.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In the preceding sections, we analysed the evolution
of governance paths regarding three species of large
mammals, focusing on the role of the actor/institutions
and knowledge/power constellation and their impact on
the various forms of steering involved. Despite appar‐
ent differences (management status, key actors involved)
these paths shared many similarities, shedding some
light on the evolution of the role of government steering.
In each case, the government was legally and adminis‐
tratively the key actor formally responsible for the man‐
agement of wildlife species defined as res communis
(Putman, 2011) and, unlike in some other countries with
state‐dominated wildlife governance (Jacobson, 2008;
von Essen et al., 2017), this position has been widely
accepted by the key groups involved. It executed its man‐
date through hierarchically subordinate public organisa‐
tions (the State Forest Holding, national parks) or by dele‐
gating some authority to the quasi‐public Polish Hunting
Association. Despite these typical command‐and‐control,
top‐down arrangements, the steering possibilities of the
government in terms of setting policy goals, monitor‐
ing the direction, and correcting deviations from the
course, did not have a top‐down character and, despite
legal opportunities, were not unlimited. Instead, as sug‐
gested by the EGT (Beunen et al., 2015), they were a
matter of informal negotiations and conflicting between
various public and non‐public groups in particular pol‐
icy sub‐domains. Their results depended strongly on the
ability of competing groups to mobilise different forms
of resources (political, financial, interpersonal, organi‐
sational, cognitive). Knowledge turned out to be a key
component in the struggles as it legitimised actors, their
expert position, and gave them arguments to influence
wildlife institutions.
As noted by Pierre and Peters (2019), much of
the governance literature has ignored the question
of who defined the goals of governance. Our study
suggests that such goals should be considered at the
level of concrete policy objectives and at the level
of ‘metagovernance.’ In all cases, in formative peri‐
ods, the sub‐domains included one guiding discourse
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including particular constructions of animals and policy
goals. These discourses, however, did not come from
the government, but from the actors dominant in pol‐
icy sub‐domains. Such actors were able to convince
the state that particular policy options were preferable
and that they should be involved in their implementa‐
tion. Consequently, together with government actors,
they formed close policy communities (Rhodes, 1997),
involvedboth in steering and rowing. In a relative conflict‐
free environment, these communities proved effective in
reaching established policy goals (bison and moose resti‐
tution, wolf reduction). With the evolution of the gov‐
ernance paths, as foreseen by the EGT, the discursive
landscapewithin the sub‐fields diversified. This was stim‐
ulated by new international discourses (the wolf case),
new fields of expertise connectedwith new conservation
stages (the bison case), or by credibility crises of existing
approaches (the moose case). Discursive changes were
accompanied by the growing diversity of actors in pol‐
icy sub‐domains resulting from the divisions within the
existing groups (e.g., scientists) and from new groups
joining the discussions (e.g., environmental NGOs after
1989). Consequently, the networks involved in gover‐
nance increasingly started resembling issue networks
(Rhodes, 1997) with diverse groups of stakeholders rep‐
resenting different interests, views and values that prob‐
lematised ‘the future of nature’ (Keulartz, 2009, p. 446).
Major socio‐economic and political critical junctures
(Collier & Collier, 1991), especially thewars and the fall of
the communist rule in 1989, as well as the EU accession
in 2004, turned out to be particularly important for the
pace of the evolution. First, these events influenced the
state of the targeted populations, which subsequently
led to increased efforts at species restitution or reduc‐
tion. Secondly, they influenced the socio‐political context
of evolving governance structures that had an effect on
the relationships between the actors in the field and on
the shape of wildlife policies. The introduction of com‐
munism after 1945 strengthened the role of public hier‐
archies in the governance of wildlife due to the central‐
isation of administration and nationalisation of forests.
The democratisation after 1989 and European integra‐
tion opened windows of opportunities for new groups
of actors in the sub‐domains, influenced the respon‐
siveness of the government, increased the access to
resources and provided new venues where the conflicts
could potentially be resolved (e.g., the EuropeanCourt of
Justice in the case of the species protected by the Habitat
Directive). Consequently, the role of non‐state groups
in governance became more pronounced. Still, some
paths initiated in the communist past have persisted, and
include largely uncontested acceptance for the dominant
role of the government in wildlife governance, as well as
material legacies that encourage state steering, e.g., due
to nationalisation, around 80% of forests in Poland (con‐
stituting key wildlife habitats) are state‐owned.
The increasing complexity of wildlife governance
after 1989 contributed to a transition of state steer‐
ing towards meta‐governance (Meuleman, 2008)—
balancing interests and managing relations between
diverse actors in the sub‐domains to use their resources
and achieve results that would present the government
as competently dealing with policy problems, comply‐
ing with its international obligations and satisfying the
general public. This could be seen as a reflection of
greater aligning control and accountability of the state
for particular policies and orienting public policy by the
larger collective interests, rather than by the interests
of self‐referential actors in the network (Pierre & Peters,
2019). New actors problematised the role of science in
wildlife management—it was still important, as it gave
different groups credibility, but was rather supportive
than essential for policymaking (Rocheleau, 2017). In our
cases this was because: (1) various groups had different
epistemic communities they could reach to for evidence
and it was difficult to establish one uncontested scien‐
tific assessment; and (2) the government tried to reach
politically sustainable policy options rather than those
best supported by scientific evidence. One of the mani‐
festations of this co‐evolution was the fact that the gov‐
ernment ceased to produce clear wildlife policy goals,
e.g., in the form of official strategies. Such strategies
seemed to limit the state more than facilitating policy
implementation. Consequently, one of the key aspects
of the state’s steering—being explicit about the objec‐
tives, norms and values and communicating it to those
rowing (Crawford, 2006)—was compromised.
At the same time, growing diversity of actors and dis‐
courses, within the same formal framework, increased
the capacities of the state to performother requirements
for steering—using resources of other (rowing) actors
and verifying and responding to their performance
(Crawford, 2006). The government did not depend on
one dominant group of actors to define the problem
and implement it, but could increasingly consider a
wider spectrum of goals and implementation tools sug‐
gested by the competing coalitions and coming from
the fields of game management and nature conserva‐
tion. Furthermore, its monitoring capacities grew, as it
could use the resources of other groups to verify infor‐
mation provided by dominant actors (e.g., wolf counts
by hunters, bison damages in forest plantations assessed
by foresters) and make more informed policy choices.
This resembled the challenges to the ‘monopoly of infor‐
mation’ of ‘subgovernments’ in US wildlife politics after
the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s
and 1970s, which helped government agencies to posi‐
tion themselves as ‘intermediaries’ between competing
groups and gave them some leeway in choosing policy
options (Nelson, 2001). Finally, due to co‐evolutions in
the sub‐domains, the state could correct deviations from
policies more effectively, going further than preferred by
the dominant groups (e.g., prolonging the moose hunt‐
ing ban).
However, increasing steering options did not mean
that the state could use them at will. Its approach
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was influenced by wider structural factors: the socio‐
economic context (e.g., socio‐economic transition after
1989), legal context (e.g., EU directives), and the polit‐
ical situation (liberal vs. conservative governments;
bottom‐up societal pressure, e.g., against bison and
moose hunting). Our cases also showed that the govern‐
mentwas not always uniform in its approach, particularly
with conservation, hunting and forestry departments
representing different rationalities and policy commu‐
nities. As noted by Peters (2011), governments often
simultaneously steer toward several, sometimes incom‐
mensurable goals, which makes the process more com‐
plex, especially when policy goals change from relatively
straightforward and undisputed (restitution of endan‐
gered species) to debatable (e.g., favourable conserva‐
tion status). These external and internal factors limited
the government steering capacity and opened windows
of opportunity for new actors to influence policies.
The state was hardly a leader of policy innovation,
yet its position as an ultimate‐decision maker was not
undermined due to powerful path dependencies and
interdependencies—a vertical distribution of power, tra‐
ditional top‐down governance patterns, superior admin‐
istrative capacities, legal powers, and ownership of key
resources. Consequently, our cases problematise the
assertion of Pierre and Peters (2019) that states are
still capable of steering society, but less based on legal
powers and more on the control of critical resources
and shaping of collective interests (e.g., through new
environmental policy instruments). We suggest that in
post‐socialist wildlife policies, both formal and material
aspects of state governance have been crucial for govern‐
ment steering. Concurrently, steering and rowing turned
out to be an ‘interactive occupation’ (Kooiman, 2003,
p. 117), where goal seeking outweighed goal setting.
Using the distinction of Voss et al. (2007), the state’s
steering increasingly moved from a problem of goals
and knowledge to steering as a power problem, involv‐
ing negotiation in networks, and as a problem of mod‐
erating co‐evolution and reflexive governance to facili‐
tate adaptation. Within existing legislation and political
and cultural history, this mode of governance proved
effective and contributed to the overcoming of grid‐
locks on wildlife issues often encountered in other coun‐
tries (Rocheleau, 2017). Largely informal adaptations
of the state’s steering facilitated retaining the central
role of government in wildlife governance despite signif‐
icant socio‐economic and political transformations that
Poland experienced in the analysed period.
At the same time, the lack of clear policy goals from
the state and associated policy instruments sustains ten‐
sions in the sub‐domains, which contribute to increasing
conflicts. This is particularly visible in the moose case,
where the State Forest Holding notes growing damages
in forest plantations, and in the wolf case, where grow‐
ing wolf numbers concern local communities, especially
in the newly established wolf territories. It is apparent
that these conflicts will soon require adequate steering
efforts from the state. Crucially, the state will need to
identify the actors responsible for the management of
these species locally. It can either restore previous hunt‐
ing institutions informed by the utilitarian discourse and
a sense of human control over the natural processes, or
create new institutions and strengthen existing organisa‐
tions (e.g., environmental agency) thatwould implement
a more ecosystem‐oriented and adaptive perspective on
the ground. The international discourses and policy initia‐
tives concerning biodiversity conservation (UNEP, 2021),
EU priorities and legal framework, as well as consider‐
able societal opposition to the lethal control of charis‐
matic wildlife seem to create favourable conditions for
the latter option. However, as suggested by the EGT, exist‐
ing dependencies and power relations within the field
might compromise more ambitious attempts at policy
innovation. The political situation in Poland and the ori‐
entation of the Polish government at conservative or pro‐
gressive values are also likely to play an important role in
the future dynamics of wildlife governance.
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